State Information in Bayesian Games

Cuff, Paul
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Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the resulting value of the game has been analyzed under the framework of Bayesian games. This investigation considers the optimal performance in a game when a helper is transmitting state information to one of the players. Encoding information for an adversarial setting (game) requires a different result than rate-distortion theory provides. Game theory has accentuated the importance of randomization (mixed strategy), which does not find a significant role in most communication modems and source coding codecs. Higher rates of communication, used in the right way, allow the message to include the necessary random component useful in games.
Comment: Presented at Allerton 2009, 6 pages, 5 eps figures, uses IEEEtran.cls
Computer Science - Information Theory, Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, H.1.1